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I. INTRODUCTION
On a December night in 1993, Gregory Bryant-Bruce, age six
months, was rushed to Vanderbilt University Medical Center
Emergency Room for treatment of severe anemia, shock, and abnor-
mally low hematocrit.' A CT scan revealed brain hemorrhaging, and
a physical examination showed retinal hemorrhages of varying ages. 2
Retinal bleeding in a young child is almost always caused by trau-
1. See Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Hosp., Inc., No. 3-96-0153, 1997 WL 440962, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997). Low hematocrit, or low red blood cell count, is usually caused by
infection or internal bleeding. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Bryant-
Bruce (No. 3-96-0153) (citing the affidavit of Dr. Niki Oquist, submitted with the summary
judgment motion).
2. See Bryant-Bruce, 1997 WL 440962, at *4.
183
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
matic injury, and is considered to be a classic sign of "Shaken Impact
Syndrome" ("SIS"), a life-threatening and relatively common form of
child abuse.3 Thus, on the basis of Gregory's symptoms and the in-
adequacy of his parents' explanation of his injuries, Gregory's doctor
suspected child abuse.4  Gregory's attending physician, a pediatric
intensivist, consulted at least five of his colleagues,5 all of whom
agreed that the medical findings "created a high suspicion of abuse."6
Ultimately, one of the colleagues, a pediatrician, made a diagnosis of
SIS and filed a report of suspected child abuse with the local Child
Protective Services ("CPS").7
The physician was not merely doing what he perceived to be
the right thing under the circumstances, nor was he unnecessarily
harassing Gregory's parents. Rather, he was complying with his
statutory duty to report suspected child abuse to the proper authori-
ties. Under the Tennessee statute,
Any person, including, but not limited to, any... [pihysician .... having
knowledge of or called upon to render aid to any child who is suffering from or
has sustained any wound, injury, disability, or physical or mental condition
which is of such a nature as to reasonably indicate that it has been caused by
brutality, abuse or neglect or which on the basis of available information rea-
sonably appears to have been caused by brutality, abuse or neglect, shall report
such harm immediately ... to the judge having juvenile jurisdiction or to the
county office of the [D]epartment [of Children's Services.]8
3. Shaken Impact Syndrome ("SIS"), also called shaken baby syndrome, is frequently
reported as "a leading cause of infant abuse." 2 DONALD T. KRAMSR, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN § 16.01, at 6 n.9 (2d ed. 1994).
Note that violence is the actual cause of injury, not the cause of abuse. The literature on the
subject refers to abuse as if it were a disease, however, typically using such terms as "diagnose"
and "symptom." See L. Lee Dowding, Comment, Immunity Under the California Child Abuse
and Neglect Reporting Act: Is Absolute Immunity the Answer?, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 377 n.34
(1990).
4. See Bryant-Bruce, 1997 WL 440962, at *10. Dr. Cheryl Bryant-Bruce, Gregory's
mother, claimed Gregory had sustained two minor, accidental falls just prior to the SIS
diagnosis, one from a bed to a carpeted floor during a diaper change, and the other on a doctor's
examination table when the child fell back from a seated position. See id. at *4, *10. The
Vanderbilt doctors concluded that injuries as serious as those Gregory suffered were unlikely to
have resulted from falls from such short distances. See id. at *10.
5. The specialists consulted included a pediatrician, a pediatric ophthalmologist, a
neurosurgeon, a pediatric hemotologist/oncologist, and a neuroradiologist. See id. at *10.
6. Id.
7. See id. The report was actually made to the Department of Human Services.
Tennessee's Child Protective Services are now under the auspices of the Department of
Children's Services, created by statute in 1996. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-101(25) (Supp.
1996) (establishing the Tennessee Department of Children's Services).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
184 [Vol. 51:183
1998] CHILD ABUSE REPORTING 185
On the basis of the physician's report, CPS sought temporary
custody of Gregory at an ex parte hearing.9 The juvenile court judge
granted CPS temporary custody. The results of CPS's investigation
and its findings were then submitted to an independent judicial
officer for review. Subsequently, the parents exercised their right to a
de novo review by the circuit court.'0 At the second proceeding, the
parents were represented by an attorney and had the opportunity to
call witnesses, including experts." The circuit court nonetheless
determined that by clear and convincing evidence, Gregory was a
victim of severe child abuse. The court affirmed the grant of custody
to CPS.12
Eighteen months later, however, the parents obtained an order
granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
suggesting an alternative explanation for the retinal bleeding which
had led to the SIS diagnosis. At that proceeding, the judge
determined that the new evidence presented by expert witnesses
meant that, although a preponderance of the evidence still supported
CPS's allegations, the state could no longer prove child abuse by
"clear and convincing evidence." 3 The judge therefore vacated the
original order. 14
Gregory's parents filed charges in federal district court'5
against Vanderbilt Hospital and each of the doctors involved in the
SIS diagnosis. The Bryant-Bruces sought to hold the defendants
9. See In the Matter of Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, No. 61-231 (Juv. Ct., Montgomery
County, Tenn. Apr. 13, 1994) (order granting temporary custody to CPS) (on file with author).
See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-114(aX2), -117(c), -120, -121(d) (1996) (providing that a court
can order a child to be taken into temporary emergency custody prior to a hearing on the basis
of a sworn petition or testimony, and that a hearing must be held within three days, unless
parents waive their right to a hearing within that time).
10. See In the Matter of Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, No. C9-916, slip. op. at 2 app. A
(Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, Tenn. Aug. 21, 1995) (setting forth the court's findings of facts
and conclusions of law). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159(a) (1996) (providing that an
appeal from the juvenile court of record is heard by the circuit court, which must try the case de
novo).
11. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-127(a) (1996) (stating that parents in a custody hearing
may introduce evidence and cross-examine adverse witnesses).
12. See In the Matter of Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, No. C9-916, slip. op. at 2 app. A
(setting forth the court's findings of facts and conclusions of law). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1-129(c) (1996) (articulating the "clear and convincing evidence" standard).
13. See In the Matter of Gregory David Bryant-Bruce, No. C9-916 (Cir. Ct., Montgomery
County, Tenn. June 12, 1995 (order setting forth the court's ruling) (on file with author).
14. See id.
15. The Bryant-Bruces moved out of state during these proceedings, which established
federal diversity jurisdiction. See Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Hospital, Inc., No. 3-96-0153,
1997 WL 440962, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997).
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liable for the allegedly erroneous report of child abuse.16 The court
ultimately granted summary judgment to Vanderbilt and the doctors
on the basis of a statutory provision that accompanies the mandatory
reporting statute: "A person reporting harm [under the child abuse
reporting provision] shall be presumed to be acting in good faith and
shall thereby be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that
might otherwise be incurred or imposed for such action."17
Notwithstanding the many claims, the primary issue in the
case was whether Vanderbilt Hospital and the individual doctor who
filed the report were immune from liability for making an allegedly
unsubstantiated report, and if so, under what standard. While
physicians are not the only group required to report child abuse, 18
they are the group most likely to be directly confronted with injuries
or ailments suggestive of maltreatment, and are considered experts in
recognizing maltreatment. 19 Moreover, as a result of legislative
efforts to target health-care professionals in reporting statutes,20
physicians and other health care professionals are reporters in a high
percentage of cases, and are thus more likely to be sued on the basis
of an unsubstantiated report.21
Because of their presumed expertise, physicians' reports to
CPS are likely to have substantial bearing on CPS's decisions
regarding the investigations and to carry significant weight in court
hearings. As a matter of common sense, a doctor's testimony is likely
to carry more weight than a child care worker's or a next door
neighbor's testimony. Consequently, in cases of erroneous reports
16. See id. at *1-*2. Gregory's parents sought damages for professional negligence, negli-
gence, malicious prosecution, abuse of legal process, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy,
defamation of character, outrageous conduct, and loss of consortium. See id. at *2.
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-410(a) (1996).
18. In Tennessee, everyone is a mandatory reporter. See id. § 37-1-403(a). In most states,
physicians and other professionals likely to be in contact with large numbers of children are
mandatory reporters, while all other people are voluntary reporters. See infra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing other states' mandatory reporting requirements).
19. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1967) (outlining the characteristics of physicians that make them
uniquely qualified to detect and report suspected child abuse). See also Allan H. McCoid, The
Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27-36 (1965)
(discussing policy arguments in the debate over mandating physician reporting of suspected
child abuse).
20. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the first generation of statutory reporting
requirements were specifically designed to overcome physicians' reluctance to report).
21. In an informal survey on LEXIS of roughly 50 cases filed against reporters, almost
40% involved charges against physicians or other healthcare workers (21/54). Search of LEXIS,
States Library, Courts File (Sept. 1, 1997) ("child abuse" w/50 report! w/50 immun!). The same
number of charges were filed against state social services departments, and a neglible number
of charges were filed against anonymous reporters (2/54), educational or child care workers
(4154), spouses or former spouses (3/54), and others (3/54). See id.
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resulting in parental loss of custody, injured and enraged parents may
have an inflated perception of the doctor's role in the proceedings.
Also as a matter of common sense, physicians are one of the groups
that the law most needs to encourage to report suspected cases of
child abuse, precisely because physicians are more likely to be
exposed to child abuse and to recognize it.22
The case of Gregory Bryant-Bruce is typical of cases around
the country involving claims against reporters.2 In particular, this
case illustrates many of the tensions between the competing interests
inherent in cases of suspected child abuse. First, the onus to report
rests disproportionately upon doctors, and they tend to take their
responsibility very seriously. Second, reporters face high legal and
emotional costs in defending their action, even if the court decides in
their favor on summary judgment, and these costs provide a tremen-
dous disincentive for compliance with reporting laws.24 Third, and
perhaps most important, the difficulty of detecting child abuse means
that some reports are determined to be "unsubstantiated" even where
actual abuse has occurred or is occurring, and CPS agencies' low
budgets and understaffing exacerbates this inherent difficulty in
detecting abuse. Moreover, reports "substantiated" by CPS may
ultimately be "disproven" at the trial or hearing stage because of the
high standard of proof required to prove abuse ("clear and convincing
22. See infra note 47 (discussing the reasons why physicians were subject to early
mandatory reporting laws).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Pound, 585 So. 2d 885, 886-87 (Ala. ,1991) (dismissing the plaintiffs
claims against a physician who complied with Alabama's mandatory reporting statute); Storch
v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 671, 675-81 (1986) (dismissing claims as "unsubstantiated"
against defendant doctors who were involved in the identification of suspected child abuse but
who did not report it, as well as those claims against doctors who did report the suspected abuse
to the authorities); Martin v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 544 N.W.2d 651, 654-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(dismissing the plaintiff parents' claim against the Michigan Department of Social Services and
against a private organization who provided services to the child at issue in the case), appeal
dismissed, Martin v. Zak, 562 N.W.2d 782,782 (Mich. 1997).
24. As Dr. Niki Oquist, the physician who reported the suspected abuse of Gregory
Bryant-Bruce, stated in his affidavit:
It is my opinion that, if physicians who are required to report possible cases of child
abuse are subjected to liability and the stress of lawsuits for having reported possible
abuse, reporting of abuse will decline. It is my opinion that physicians concerned about
the ramifications of reporting will shy away from reporting those cases where the
evidence of abuse is not perfectly clear. It is well known that child abuse goes largely
unreported, and I believe strongly that physicians, and others who interact regularly
with children, should not be further deterred from reporting possible cases of abuse
because of the fear of legal action being taken against them.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment app. 3 at 16, Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Hosp.,
Inc., No. 3-96-0153, 1997 WL 440962 (M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997).
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evidence"). 5 Fourth, families suffering high emotional costs when a
child is removed from parental custody erroneously, or on the basis of
a report that is ultimately unsubstantiated, usually have no remedy
at law against the reporters or against the state's protective services
due to immunity provisions for reporters and state actors. Such
immunity provisions, however, do not prevent families from suing,
and thus forcing hospitals and other institutions to devote substantial
amounts of energy, money, and resources to defend against the
charges. These and other factors support the policy of protecting
reporters in spite of the potential harm to some innocent parties.
Every state in the country has provisions similar to
Tennessee's mandatory reporting law and its immunity provision.26
Such statutes reflect legislative recognition that child abuse is an
enormous problem,27 and that in order to increase protection of
children, it is necessary to encourage reporting. In essence, these
laws reflect a fundamental policy decision to afford as much
protection to as many children as possible, even at the expense of
hurting some innocent parties.2 8
It is the premise of this Note that the policy behind federal and
state child protection laws is undergoing a significant shift toward
greater protection of parents, at the likely expense of greater harm to
abused children. The policy shift is partly the result of the growing
strength of "Parents' Rights" groups, and is signaled by the passage of
some portions of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act Amendments of 1996 ("CAPTA Amendments"),29 which the
rhetoric of "Parents' Rights" organizations plainly influenced. Part H
of this Note briefly examines the historical development of child
protective statutes, which culminated in the passage of the Child
25. It is important to recognize that an "unsubstantiated" report is not necessarily an
erroneous report. Gregory Bryant-Bruce's parents were ultimately "vindicated," but there was
still no clear evidence that they had not abused their child, only insufficient "clear and
convincing" evidence that they had.
California actually distinguishes between "unfounded" reports (meaning reports
"determined... to be false, to be inherently improbable") and "unsubstantiated" reports
(meaning reports "determined... not to be insufficient evidence to determine whether child
abuse... has occurred"). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12 (West 1992).
26. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (listing other states' mandatory reporting re-
quirements).
27. See infra Part II (discussing legislative responses to the problem of child abuse).
28. See, e.g., Storch, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 682 ("[I]n the tension between the grant of civilimmunity occasioned by a duty to report and the spectre of a false report, some sacrifice is borne
by those who may be wrongfully investigated but unable to seek legal redress."). See infra Part
II (discussing immunity for those reporting child abuse to authorities).
29. Pub. L. No. 104-235, 110 Stat. 3063 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i).
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Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA7).30 Part IIl
looks at current state statutes passed largely in response to the origi-
nal CAPTA. This Part discusses judicial interpretations of reporter
inunity laws, distinguishing between those states already providing
absolute immunity for reporters and those offering only good faith
immunity. Part HI also considers the state Child Protective Services
agencies' role after a report has been made. Part IV describes the
legislative history underlying the CAPTA Amendments, and considers
the role of "Parents' Rights" groups in pushing legislation that favors
parental interests over children's interests. Part V analyzes the
probable effect of the CAPTA Amendments and the policy shift they
signal in regard to current immunity provisions for private reporters
and state protective agencies. Part VI concludes that the CAPTA
Amendments' higher immunity threshold and ambivalence toward
promoting reporting will ultimately increase litigation, and thus the
cost of good faith child abuse reporting, and increase liability for
erroneously reporting child abuse. Increased litigation and decreased
immunity will likely have a serious chilling effect on child abuse
reporting and provide a tremendous disincentive for state agencies to
react promptly to reports of suspected abuse.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first reported criminal cases involving child abuse in the
United States date back to the late 1600s,31 but no documented civil
child protection case appeared until 1874.32 That case moved the
petitioner to establish the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children.33  This organization and similar organizations
were instrumental in calling attention to the maltreatment of
children during the late nineteenth century, in bringing criminal
complaints against perpetrators, and in placing thousands of
neglected children in institutional care. 34 These organizations also
facilitated the implementation of the first juvenile court system in
New York in 1899.
30. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994)).
31. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.01, at 6 (discussing the historical background of
protections against child abuse).
32. See id. at 7.
33. See id. The petitioner had previously founded the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, which may speak volumes about our priorities.
34. See id.
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By 1930 every state but two had implemented similar juvenile
court systems.35 From the courts' inception, cases involving child
maltreatment in all its various forms were a "major part of these
courts' jurisdiction."6 The early- to mid-twentieth century saw a
growing recognition of the "state's responsibility for the ultimate
protection of children."37 The doctrine of parens patriae38 and the
35. See id.
36. Id. During the early part of the 20th century, most children involved in serious cases
of abuse or neglect were placed in institutions devoted to the care of such children. The child
welfare movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries led to the establishment of the first
institutions dedicated to the care of abandoned, abused, neglected, wayward, and delinquent
children. Often a child placed in such an "orphan asylum" or "foundling asylum" remained there
until adulthood. See id. at 8. Foster care, though not unheard of, was a relatively rare solution.
See infra Part I.B (discussing the use of foster care as a "last resort" in a case of suspected
child abuse).
37. 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.01, at 8. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (stating that "Ea]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control... in many ways"). Throughout the 20th
century, courts attempted to define the legal parameters of parents' interest in their children.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (holding that a state's interest in univer-
sal education must be balanced against "the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that
a state may not presume parental unfitness without a hearing on parental qualifications);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a law mandating
attendance at state primary schools because it unreasonably interfered "with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (holding that the "power of parents to control
the education" of their children falls within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Much of the current debate in the area of children's law focuses on supposed conflicts between
parents' constitutional rights, children's constitutional rights, and the state's interest in
providing for the health and safety of children. See, e.g., James B. Boskey, The Swamps of
Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-Child Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 852 (1995)
(arguing that "the relationship between an adult and child should be defined in terms of the
interests of the child rather than those of the parent"); Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the
Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 40 (arguing that the interests of children are best protected
by legislation since the constitutional rights of children have been interpreted to extend no
farther than those of adults); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare:
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1994) (arguing that
children's rights, rather than parents' rights, should constitute the legal basis for protecting the
interests of children); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspective and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 21 (1994) (advocating according children standing
in support and custody disputes in order to transform the current understanding of family
disputes as conflicts between adult individuals and state interests); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie
that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent.Like
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 362 (1994) (arguing that "the law should accord children an
independent liberty interest in their relationships with both 'legal parents' and 'nonlegal
parents' irrespective of biological ties"); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's
Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 295 (1995) (arguing that conceptions of individual freedom and
opposition to state intervention in families fuel a cultural resistance to rights for children); Lynn
D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 321, 348 (1996) (arguing that strengthening marriage as a social institution
will more fully protect children's interests than giving children constitutional rights enforceable
against their parents).
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"best interests of the child" 39 standard developed in response to this
recognition. According to a leading authority, these "two legal
doctrines... controlled all judicial proceedings affecting abused and
neglected children."40 Nonetheless, child abuse was not formally
identified as a medical condition until the 1962 publication of The
Battered Child Syndrome4 (the "Kempe article"). This article
stimulated professional recognition of the full dimensions of the child
maltreatment problem and helped bring the issue to the general
public's attention.42 The Kempe article defined child abuse quite
simply and narrowly as a "non-accidental physical injury" or "willful
trauma."43 The article also noted patterns and symptoms of battered
children."
38. Black's Law Dictionary states that the term "parens patriae," which literally means
"parent of the country," traditionally refers to the:
[Riole of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles or the insane,... and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf
of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must
care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care
and custody from their parents ....
Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants. In
the United States, the parens patriae function belongs with the states.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
39. "Best interests of the child" refers to "[the] state's responsibility to assure that its
actions are conducive to the best interests of the child." 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.01, at 8.
What exactly constitutes a child's best interests, who should decide what they are, and when
they should be determinative in the outcome of a case are hotly debated topics. See, e.g.,
Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False
Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 63, 66 (1995) ("We contend
that the constitutional standards allowing parents to determine what is in the best interests of
their children, so long as parents are willing and able to make these decisions, assure an
optimal balance between the interests of family integrity and child protection."); Jerry A.
Behnke, Note, Pawns or People? Protecting the Best Interests of Children in Interstate Custody
Disputes, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 699, 739 (1995) (arguing for a federal statute requiring states to
recognize the rights and interests of the child above all parental rights whenever a child's
placement is at issue); Elizabeth P. Miller, Note, DeBoer v. Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does
the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 20 J. CoNTEmp.
L. 497, 519 (1994) (suggesting that courts should balance the rights of biological parents with
those of "psychological parents" in custody proceedings to safeguard the best interests of
children); Michael A. Weinberg, Note, DeBoer v. Schmidt: Disregarding the Child's Best
Interests in Adoption Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 1099, 1126 (1994) (stating that a child
should have standing to bring an action to obtain a "best interest" hearing in custody disputes).
40. 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.01, at 8.
41. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASSN 17,
17 (1962) ("The battered-child syndrome is a term used by us to characterize a clinical condition
in young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from a parent or foster
parent.").
42. See Barbara Daly, Willful Child Abuse and the State Reporting Statutes, 23 MIAMI U.
L. REV. 283, 284-85 & n.5 (1969) (referring to the mass media response to the Kempe article).
43. Kempe et al., supra note 41, at 23.
44. See id. at 24.
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Contemporaneous to the publication of the Kempe article, the
Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare published a model statute that required physicians to report
suspected child abuse, and applied criminal sanctions if a physician
knowingly and willfully failed to report.45  State legislatures
responded to these two publications by enacting mandatory child
abuse reporting laws as part of their child protective codes. By 1967,
every state, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands had
enacted some form of child abuse reporting provision.46 States varied
as to how they defined child abuse, whom they required to report
suspected abuse, and whether reporting was permissive or
mandatory, but all states included physicians among the enumerated
reporters.47 Every state included some immunity provision as an
incentive to reporting, but the degree and scope of such immunity
varied widely.48
In 1974, the federal government enacted the first version of
CAPTA.49 CAPTA allocated money to the states for the identification,
treatment, and prevention of child abuse. 5° To be eligible for funds,51
each state had to provide for the reporting of known or suspected
child abuse, 52 provide immunity to reporters from civil and criminal
liability,53 provide for investigation of reports by the proper state
authority, and also provide for the health and welfare of any children
45. See Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20
FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 n.5 (1986) (citing CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, THE ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON
REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD 11-13 (1963)).
46. See id.
47. See Daly, supra note 42, at 306 (noting that physician reporting is "permitted or
required by all the states"). Physicians were targeted by early reporting laws because of the
assumption that they were more likely than other groups to come in contact with injured
children. Experience had shown, too, that doctors were less likely to report voluntarily than
other groups of professionals who came in contact with abused children. The early reporting
statutes were thus meant to overcome the disincentives preventing doctors from reporting. See
Paulsen, supra note 19, at 3-4 (stating that "[ilt was felt that a good many physicians felt that
reporting was either 'meddling' or a violation of a 'professional confidence' " and that many
physicians were likely deterred by fear of civil liability as well).
48. See Daly, supra note 42, at 327 (providing an overview of the type of immunity offered
by each state).
49. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994)).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1) (1994), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066.
51. See id. § 5103(b)(2), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066.
52. See id. § 5103(b)(2)(B), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066.
53. See id. § 5103(b)(2)(A), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066.
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in the household if abuse is found.54 Most states already complied
with many of the requirements before CAPTA's passage, but the
federal statute did have substantial influence on subsequent
generations of state reporting statutes.55
In particular, it appears that CAPTA brought the immunity
provisions to the public's attention and thus led to an increase in the
numbers of reports. 56 Also, by enunciating national policy, the Act
guided state legislatures in formulating and articulating policy at the
local level. For example, in 1973, thirty-four states had a purpose
clause in their child abuse statutes, whereas forty states had one by
1977. 57 CAPTA also helped states organize child protective systems
designed to respond to reports of suspected abuse and neglect, and it
may have brought the need to fund these programs to states' atten-
tion.58
CAPTA's express purpose was to help states implement pro-
grams to deal with the problem of child abuse. 9 The Act responded to
a recognition that, in spite of reporting and immunity laws already in
place, underreporting still hampered efforts to bring aid to abused
children.60 The legislative history of the Act also indicates a concern
that not all states had laws requiring further inquiry or treatment of
54. See id. § 5103(bX2XA), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066. Other requirements
dealt with administrative procedures; personnel training, confidentiality requirements;
ensuring cooperation among law enforcement officials, courts and welfare agencies; guardians
ad litem; financing, dissemination of information; and preferencing "parental organizations
combating child abuse and neglect." Id. § 5103(bX2XD)-(J), repealed by Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 103, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066. See
Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A
Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
641, 648 (1978) (discussing the provisions of CAPTA).
55. See Fraser, supra note 54, at 649 (noting CAPTA's "substantial impact" on state
reporting statutes).
56. An estimated 60,000 reports were made in 1974. In 1993 there were just under
3,000,000. See Child Welfare: Where Should Our Priorities Be? Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Early Childhood, Youth & Families of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Anne Cohn Donnelly, Executive Director,
National Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse), available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY
Database.
57. See Fraser, supra note 54, at 651.
58. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 48 (complaining in 1967 that too few states had
appropriated additional funds for extending services to new cases revealed by mandatory
reporting).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 93-685, at 2-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 2763, 2765-66
(concluding that the federal government needed to take an increased role in supporting state
and local child welfare agencies).
60. See id. ("Witnesses agreed that most estimates of the incidence of child abuse
represent only a small proportion of the number of children who are actually maltreated.").
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the reported cases.6' Thus an important aspect of the Act was its
focus on intervention. It was still criticized both for not providing
enough funding and for involving the federal government in an area
that had thus far been reserved entirely to the states.62
III. STATE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
1. Overview
Today, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, American
Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have report-
ing laws.63 Although each state's laws differ somewhat from other
61. See id. (stating that most state laws did not "require any followup or treatment once a
case of abuse has been reported").
62. See id. at 4-5 (stating the dissenting views that preventing child abuse was not the
responsiblity of the federal government and that no new source of revenue was provided to fund
CAPTA).
63. See generally ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1992); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010 to -. 290
(Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-30-101
to -109 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19-13-301 to -316 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-101 to -107 (West
1992 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-909 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351 to -
1363 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.501-.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5
(1991 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-1 to -5 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-
1601 to -1637 (1979 & Supp. 1997); 325 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/1 to 5/11.7 (West 1993 & Supp.
1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-33-5-5 to -6-3 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.67 to -.77
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1521 to -1526 (1993 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 620.010 to -.080 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West
1986 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4001-4017 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-701 to -705 (1991 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§
51a-51g (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.621-.636 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); MN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-353, 43-21-355, 43-
23-9 (1993 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.110 to -.167 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
41-3-101 to -208 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-711 to -717 (1995 & Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 432B.010 to -.320 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:1 to -C:40 (1994 &
Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 to -.20 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-4-1 to -22
(Michie 1995); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 411-420 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-542 to -551 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01 to -14 (1989 & Supp. 1997); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Banks-Baldwin 1993 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-848
(West 1983); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 418.740-.775 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 6301-6319 (West
Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-1 to -16 (1990 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-480
to -560 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-8A-1 to -16 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1401 to -414 (1996); TEL Fm. CODE ANN. §§ 261.101 to -.109
(West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4a-401 to -412 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 4911-4920
(1991 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.3 to -248.17 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010-.080 (West 1997); W. VA- CODE §§ 49-6A-1 to -8 (1996);
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states' laws, substantial uniformity in format and in overall effect
now exists due at least in part to CAPTA's passage. In general, most
reporting statutes include a purpose clause;64 a definition of child
abuse;65 an indication of who must or may report under the statute;6
a description of how, when, and to whom one should report;67 an
immnty provision;68  abrogation of certain privileged
communications, such as wife/husband and doctor/patient;69 and a
penalty provision for failure to report. Other portions of state juvenile
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-201 to -210 (Michie 1997); 19
GuAM CODE ANN. §§ 13202-13212 (1995); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 401-437 (1996); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2532-2540 (Supp. 1997).
64. For example, the Tennessee code provides as follows:
The purpose of this part is to protect children whose physical or mental health and
welfare are adversely affected by brutality, abuse or neglect by requiring reporting of
suspected cases by any person having cause to believe that such case exists. It is
intended that, as a result of such reports, the protective services of the state shall be
brought to bear on the situation to prevent further abuses, to safeguard and enhance the
welfare of children, and to preserve family life. This part shall be administered and
interpreted to provide the greatest possible protection as promptly as possible for
children.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-402(a) (1996). By way of contrast, the New Jersey statute states
simply that its purpose is "to provide for the protection of children... who have had serious
injury inflicted upon them by other than accidental means." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 (West
1993).
65. For example, Tennessee defines abuse as "a wound, injury, disability or physical or
mental condition caused by brutality, neglect or other actions or inactions of a parent, relative,
guardian or caretaker." TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b) (1996).
66. In Tennessee, for example, "[ajny person having knowledge of or called upon to render
aid to any child who is suffering from [any injury] which is of such a nature as to reasonably
indicate that it has been caused by brutality, abuse or neglect" must report. See id. § 37-1-
403(a). In other states, healthcare workers and any other professionals who routinely come in
contact with children in the course of their profession are required to report, while all other
people may report. See, for example, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.115 (1986), which imposes certain
duties upon:
any physician, medical examiner, coroner, dentist, chiropracter, optometrist, podiatrist,
resident, intern, nurse, hospital or clinic personnel that are engaged in the examination,
care, treatment, or research of persons, and any other health practioner, psychologist,
mental health professional, social worker, day care center worker or other child care
worker, juvenile officer, probation or parole officer, teacher, principal, or other school
official, or other person with responsibility for the care of children [who] has reasonable
cause to suspect that a child has been or may be subjected to abuse or neglect or
observes a child being subjected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably
result in abuse or neglect ....
67. See infra Part IIl.B (outlining state reporting procedures).
68. See infra Part HI.A.2 and LI.A.3 (discussing state approaches to immunity for
reporters of suspected child abuse).
69. Tennessee's law states that husband/wife, psychiatrist/patient, and
psychologist/patient privileges are inapplicable in child abuse cases. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-411 (1996). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.512 (West Supp. 1997) (abrogating privileges
except as between attorney and client). Some states abrogate even the attorney/client privilege.
See Fraser, supra note 54, at 655 & n.163 (identifying Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico,
and Oklahoma as abrogating all privileged communications in cases of child abuse).
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codes deal with the responsibility of CPS agencies to respond to
reports and provide for the welfare of the children and the families
involved.70
The growing number of cases in which reporters are sued for
allegedly erroneous reports can perhaps serve as testimony to the
efficacy of reporting statutes. Unfortunately, such cases also substan-
tiate potential reporters' reasons for not reporting. Though courts
thus far have granted or upheld summary judgment for defendant
reporters in nearly every case to reach the appellate level, it remains
to be seen whether this trend will continue.71
2. Interpretations of Good Faith Immunity
The original CAPTA required that states have immunity provi-
sions for reporters.72 Although the federal statute did not require a
specific degree of immunity, the vast majority of states have
implemented immunity provisions for "good faith" reporting, with a
small minority choosing to provide "absolute" immunity.73
Commentators have claimed that immunity provisions are
"cosmetic," because to sue successfully, a plaintiff would always have
to show that a mandatory reporter acted with a malicious purpose:
"To successfully block a suit such as this, it would only be necessary
to show that the reporter reported in good faith."74 The same
commentators assert that, even if only cosmetic, the provisions serve
the valuable purpose of reassuring those who are required to report
but may be afraid to report.75
70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-5-101 to -406 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (covering the
creation, purpose, and powers of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services).
71. See infra Part V (discussing a policy shift which may result in increased liability for
reporters).
72. CAPTA mandated "provisions for immunity for persons reporting instances of child
abuse and neglect from prosecution, under any state or local law, arising out of such reporting
[and to] provide for the reporting of known or suspected instances of child abuse and neglect."
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(bX1XA)-(B), 88 Stat.
4, 6 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1XA)-(B) (1994)).
73. Every state except California, Alabama, Ohio, and possibly New Jersey, which provide
"absolute immunity," has chosen to implement "good faith" reporting immunity provisions. See
infra Part IILA.3 (discussing the grant of absolute immunity to reporters of suspected child
abuse, regardless of the reporter's good faith).
74. Fraser, supra note 54, at 664. See also Paulsen, supra note 19, at 31 (noting that "[i]t
is ironic that legal immunity, a factor so important in the discussions about the need for child
abuse reporting legislation[,I is probably unnecessary [and that no] liability, in fact, [exists] for
good faith reporting of the sort which the reporting laws now mandate or permit").
75. See Fraser, supra note 54, at 664 (asserting that immunity provisions do reassure
those with a mandatory obligation to report).
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In practice, however, the effect of the provisions has been more
than cosmetic. If the immunity provisions were not in place, it is
fairly clear that liability would be imposed in some cases for negligent
reporting, and more cases would actually go to trial for a factual de-
termination of whether the reporter had acted in good faith.
Moreover, courts would likely feel compelled to countenance charges
such as those brought in the case of Gregory Bryant-Bruce, in which
the plaintiffs brought several claims.76 Thus, the primary effect of
immunity provisions, whether "good faith" or "absolute," is probably
to justify disposition of cases on summary judgment. Notably, courts
have interpreted the "good faith" statutes to afford immunity for
negligent reporting,77 whereas courts would most likely not uniformly
accord such immunity in the absence of an immunity provision.78
The language in the various opinions considering the issue of
good faith immunity also suggests that the provisions are not merely
cosmetic. Courts have relied heavily on the-wording of statutes and
on the legislative purpose behind the statutes to support granting
summary judgments. For example, in Maples v. Siddiqui,79 the
defendant physician diagnosed a child as suffering from failure to
thrive syndrome, attributable to poor parenting skills*80 The
physician's report and subsequent testimony that she had eliminated
all physiological explanations for the child's condition resulted in the
placement of the child in temporary foster care.8' Two months later,
76. See Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Hosp., Inc., No. 3-96-0153, 1997 WL 440962, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997) (dismissing plaintiffs claims of a violation of constitutional rights,
negligence, malicious prosecution, abuse of legal process, invasion of privacy, false
imprisonment, defamation of characer, and loss of consortion). See also Dowding, supra note 3,
at 379-80 (suggesting that without statutory immunity, reporters might be subject to charges of
malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, false light
invasion of privacy, and negligence).
77. See, e.g., Michaels v. Gordon, 439 S.E.2d 722, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant psychologist on the basis that "proof of mere negligence or
bad judgment is not proof [of bad faith]"); D.L.C. v. Walsh, 908 S.W.2d 791, 799-801 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendant doctors under Kansas law on the basis
that the Kansas immunity statute provided immunity for negligent misdiagnosis of suspected
child abuse).
78. Some cases suggest that, in the absence of an immunity provision, parents injured by
erroneous reports of abuse might prevail against reporting doctors on malpractice claims.
Compare Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. 1994) (holding no liability because the
defendant mental health professional owed no duty to parent not to negligently misdiagnose
child's condition), with Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 289 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that a "mental health care provider owes a duty to any person... who is the subject of any
public report," but finding no liability because the statute provided immunity for negligence).
79. 450 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1990).




the child was diagnosed with malabsorption syndrome, which
accounted for his failure to thrive.82 The parents sued the reporting
doctor for malpractice, alleging damages for loss of companionship.83
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment, finding that courts must assume that legislative grants of
immunity are intended to extend to situations where liability would
otherwise exist for negligent acts or some other breach of legal duty.8 4
The court stressed that holding otherwise would thwart Iowa's
immunity statute, the purpose of which is to encourage those who
"suspect child abuse to freely report it to authorities without fear of
reprisal if their factual information proves to be faulty."85
Similarly, courts have relied on "objective" or "subjective" in-
terpretations of good faith in order to further the perceived legislative
purpose when upholding summary judgments. In F.A. v. W.J.F.,s a
New Jersey appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of sum-
mary judgment in a case against reporters where the plaintiff alleged
malice on the part of the reporters. To justify its holding, the court
quoted New Jersey's purpose clause and concluded that the legislative
purpose of encouraging reporting would be too easily frustrated if
reporters were repeatedly subject to "costly and protracted civil litiga-
tion."87 To further the statute's purpose, the court concluded that an
objective test should be used to decide whether a report was made
pursuant to the statute, and to facilitate "speedy determination by
way of summary judgment."88 Because deposition testimony and the
findings of the New Jersey CPS agency showed that the defendants
had "reasonable cause" to believe abuse occurred, the court required
no factual inquiry into the defendants' motives for reporting.89
Another court has applied a "subjective test" to determine that
a factual inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendants' action was
not required in order to achieve the same outcome: summary judg-
82. See id. at 530.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 530-31.
85. Id. at 530. See also D.L.C. v. Walsh, 908 S.W.2d 791, 798-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing the purpose clause of the Kansas reporting statute in support of an affirmation of
summary judgment for defendant doctors). The Walsh court stated that: "To hold otherwise
would discourage individuals from reporting suspected child abuse [which was the purpose of
the reporting requirement]." Id. at 799.
86. 656 A.2d 43,49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
87. Id. at 46-47.
88. Id. at 47.
89. See id. at 49 (concluding that a factual inquiry into the reasonableness of the
defendant's actions was not required by the objective good faith standard applied by the court).
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ment in favor of defendants. 9° In that case, plaintiffs argued that an
objective assessment of the defendants' conduct raised a question of
material fact as to the reasonableness of their actions, and, thus,
summary judgment should not have been granted.91 The reviewing
court disagreed, finding that a subjective standard applied:
"Reasonableness and the objective (reasonable person) standard are
the hallmarks of negligence. Because immunity under [our reporting
statute] extends to negligent acts, reasonableness and the objective
standard play no part in determining good faith."92 The defendants'
subjective good faith was uncontroverted, so summary judgment in
their favor was affirmed. 93
A number of statutes include a "presumption" of good faith in
their immunity statutes,9 and courts have upheld summary judg-
ments on the basis that such presumptions are indicative of
legislative intent to protect reporters' immunity.95 On the other hand,
immunity is rarely denied merely because the statute did not provide
for a "presumption" of good faith.96
Ultimately, regardless of how courts have interpreted good
faith, they have generally found defendants' behavior to fall within
the necessary parameters, and they have almost unanimously relied
on expressions of legislative purpose to support grants of summary
90. See Garvis v. Scholten, 492 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa 1992) (stating that the defendant's
good faith went unchallenged).
91. See id. at 403-04.
92. Id. at 404.
93. See id.
94. At least 17 state statutes provide for a presumption of good faith, including Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
supra note 63 (providing citations to individual state's reporting statutes).
95. See, e.g., Evans v. Torres, No. 94-C-1078 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19472, at *8 (N.D. I11.
Dec. 27, 1995) (noting Illinois's strong interest in "promoting the welfare of children"), claim
dismissed, Evans v. Torres, No. 94-C-1078 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14290, at *1 (N.D. IMl. Sept.
17, 1997); Young v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 721 F. Supp. 197, 200 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (stating
that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the "liberty interest in familial
relations is limited by the compelling government interest" in protecting children against
abuse); Thomas v. Beth Israel Hosp., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 935, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing
New York's protection of reporting physicians through its immunity provision); Lehman v.
Stephens, 499 N.E.2d 103, 109-110 (Mll. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing an important state interest
in curtailing child abuse); Warner v. Mitts, 536 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that the purpose of immunity is to facilitate the reporting of suspected child abuse), appeal
denied, 546 N.W.2d 264, 264 (Mich. 1996).
96. See, e.g., Freed v. Worcester County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 518 A.2d 159, 163 n.12 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (stating that although "presumption" is not part of statutory language,
there is still a presumption of good faith, because plaintiff has burden of proving bad faith). But
see Hope v. Landau, 500 N.E.2d 809, 810 n.3 (Mass. 1986) (observing that the reporting statute
"provides immunity only for good faith action, which, contrary to the Appeals Court, we believe
should not be presumed in favor of defendants [who were not required to report]").
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judgment in favor of defendant reporters. Courts in only a few states
have gone farther and found statutory justification for granting
absolute immunity to reporters.
3. States Guaranteeing Absolute Immunity
Alabama, California, Ohio, and possibly New Jersey extend
immunity to reporters who are alleged to have knowingly made false
reports, or otherwise reported with malicious intent.97 These states
offer "absolute" immunity rather than just good faith immunity.
Absolute immunity practically assures summary judgments in favor
of doctors and other professional reporters, and theoretically creates a
disincentive to plaintiffs from filing suits against reporters. In theory,
absolute immunity renders reporting less burdensome and thus en-
courages reporting better than good faith immunity does.
In reality, the effect of absolute immunity is distressingly
slight. California and Alabama distinguish between mandatory and
voluntary reporters, according the latter only good faith immunity.
For example, in California, only child care custodians, health practi-
tioners, employees of CPS agencies, and commercial film and photo-
graphic print processors have absolute immunity as mandatory re-
porters under the statute.98 All other people may report but are not
required to report.9 9 The assumption that professionals are unlikely
to indulge in "bad faith" reporting supports according them absolute
immunity. °0 0 However, absolute immunity, precisely because it tends
97. See Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Ala. 1983) (stating that the
defendants were made absolutely immune by statute). See also Brown v. Pound, 585 So. 2d 885,
887 (Ala. 1991) (reaffirming the Harris decision and finding that the Alabama code provides
absolute immunity for reporting suspected child abuse, except as to claims alleging damage not
related to the reporting of suspected abuse); Krikorian v. Barry, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1211, 1218-19
(1987) (providing absolute immunity even for maliciously or knowingly false reports); Storch v.
Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 671, 678 (1986) (according absolute immunity to reporters of child
abuse); F. v. W.J.F., 656 A.2d 43, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (construing the
immunity statute "liberally," applying an "objective" test, and focusing on whether a reasonable
basis for reporting existed, and encouraging trial courts to use summary judgement procedures);
Cudlin v. Cudlin, 580 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (providing absolute immunity for
voluntary reporters); Criswell v. Brentwood Hosp., 551 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(finding that the reporting statute represented a policy decision by the Ohio legislature that the
"societal benefits arising from encouraging the reporting and prosecution of child abuse by
granting immunity outweigh any individual harm which might arise from false reports").
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1992).
99. See id.
100. See Storch, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 679-80 (discussing the benefits of absolute immunity).
The Storch court stated:
The cost of legal representation to defend, and the human toll in time wasted and
anxiety suffered, are sufficient to deter many potential reporters. Since there exist
numerous legal and personal impediments to reporting to the detriment of an abused
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to protect professionals unlikely to engage in bad faith or malicious
reporting, may not offer any substantive protection greater than that
afforded by good faith immunity: Reporters can still be sued and
generally must still defend against that suit at least to the summary
judgment stage. Nonetheless, absolute immunity does perform three
important functions: (1) deterring litigation, (2) insuring that most
suits that are filed will be dismissed on summary judgment, and (3)
reassuring reporters that they will not incur liability.
The absolute immunity standard does leave open one loophole
for plaintiffs to sue reporters: Absolute immunity depends on an
objective assessment of a reporter's action rather than a subjective
one. Theoretically, then, if a mandatory reporter could not show he or
she had "reasonable cause" for reporting a suspicion of child abuse,
absolute immunity would not attach because the report would not
have satisfied statutory guidelines.lo1 Practically speaking, however,
no cases in absolute immunity jurisdictions have turned on this
point.102
States providing absolute immunity, like those providing good
faith immunity, do so to protect children by encouraging people to
report known or suspected child abuse. Nonetheless, reporters in
absolute immunity jurisdictions, like those in good faith jurisdictions,
remain subject to lawsuits that cost time and money whether or not
reporters win on summary judgment.103
B. "The System": What Happens after a Report Is Made?
Pursuant to CAPTA's requirements, each state operates some
form of Child Protective Services agency to receive and respond to
reports of suspected child abuse.104 In Tennessee for example, people
may report to the appropriate juvenile judge, to the sheriffs office or
the local law enforcement office, or to the local office of the
child, it is reasonable to eliminate the limitations on civil and criminal immunity for
objective non-biased professionals.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., F.A, 656 A.2d at 47 (applying an "objective" test).
102. The California statute, however, explicitly provides that" reasonable suspicion' means
that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could
cause a reasonable person in like position... to suspect child abuse." CAL. PENAL CODE §
11166(a) (West Supp. 1997).
103. At least one other commentator has argued that even absolute immunity is
insufficient to protect reporters for this reason. See Dowding, supra note 3, at 389-90 (noting
that reporters still lose money and time even if suits are dismissed).
104. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, §
4(b)(2XC)-(D), 88 Stat. 4, 6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(2)-(3) (1994)).
1998] 201
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Department of Children's Services. 105 If a judge or law enforcement
agent receives a report, he or she must immediately transfer the
information to the Department of Children's Services. 106
The CPS agency's responsibility thus begins with receiving
reports of suspected abuse or neglect. In theory, the agency must
investigate every report. In reality, CPS workers perform
"triage'--generally allocating available resources to investigate the
serious allegations and using their discretion to dismiss vague or
trivial-sounding reports.107  Because of reasonable assumptions
regarding a physician's expertise in identifying the cause of an injury
and a physician's objectivity with regard to the possible perpetrator,108
CPS workers are likely to take a physician's report seriously and rely
on it heavily in a petition for emergency custody. For example, in the
case of Gregory Bryant-Bruce, CPS's reliance on the Vanderbilt physi-
cian's diagnosis led the agency to seek emergency custody of Gregory
before conducting any additional investigation.109
In general, following a call, CPS will "promptly" investigate
and determine whether there is reasonable or probable cause to be-
lieve the child has been abused or neglected.1 ° If the investigation
reveals maltreatment, the agency's job is to work with parents to
correct their behavior and improve their parenting skills."' If the
maltreatment is severe or the parents will not voluntarily correct the
problem, CPS may petition the court for custody of their child. This
step may have the intended effect of forcing parents to comply for fear
of losing custody of the child."2 Generally, law enforcement agents
and the criminal justice system become involved only in cases of
death, serious injury, or sexual abuse. For the most part, the trend
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a) (1996).
106. See id. § 37-1-403(d).
107. Telephone Interview with Susan Orr, Court Appointed Special Advocates social
worker, Davidson County Juvenile Justice Center (February 21, 1997).
108. Other reporters may be suspected of harboring other motives, however, particularly in
the context of divorce and disputed custody.
109. See Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Hosp., Inc., No. 3-96-0153, 1997 WL 440962, at *3, *5
(M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997) (discussing actions taken by CPS based on a report made by a
physician).
110. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-406(a) (1996).
111. Theoretically, an "array of public and private resources may be available to the child
protective unit. In many instances, a local multidisciplinary team may be used[,]... typically
made up of physicians, mental health experts, social workers or caseworkers, nurses, attorneys,
and law enforcement personnel." 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.18, at 74. The services made
available by treatment agencies may include "home-based services," which may include sending
someone to teach parents basic home-making and child-rearing skills, counseling services, and
emergency day care. See id.
112. See id. at 73 (explaining that a petition to a court may force parents to take remedial
steps).
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has been to de-criminalize child abuse proceedings, under the theory
that criminal intent is generally lacking13 and that prosecution does
not help the situation."4 The child protective agencies' goals, as
articulated in legislative purpose clauses, of protecting children first
and preserving families whenever possible may justify this trend.
Removing children from homes should be considered a last resort.
After removal, the agency's goal is to reunite the children with their
families as soon as it becomes feasible." 5
Since the inception of CPS agencies, the agencies have faced
criticism for, among other things, inadequate staff training, interven-
ing too late, intervening unnecessarily, failing to investigate properly,
lack of coordination among various facets of the child protective
"team," bad budgeting, and providing insufficient treatment pro-
grams. 1 6 Also since their inception, the agencies have suffered from
inadequate funding which has contributed in large part to the prob-
lems for which they have been criticized." 7 In addition to the
lambasting they suffer, CPS agents and agencies may face lawsuits
charging negligent failure to investigate a report,118 and, increasingly,
negligent investigation of allegedly erroneous reports.119  Courts
113. See Douglas J. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect, 23 VML. L. REV. 448, 458 (1978) (stating that the purpose of reporting laws
is to foster the protection of children and not to "punish those who mistreat them").
114. See Daly, supra note 42, at 297-98 (stating that the decline in criminal prosecutions
may be due to the desire to keep families together, as well as the fact that criminal convictions
for child abuse are difficult to obtain).
115. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 3, § 16.18, at 73.
116. See Fraser, supra note 54, at 668 (listing various criticisms of CPS agencies).
117. See Paulsen, supra note 19, at 49 ("Without adequate resources to back up a reporting
plan the entire effort is an exercise in futility.").
118. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1988), the Supreme Court held that a CPS agency's failure to prevent the permanent impair-
ment of a child by abuse did not violate the constitutional rights of that child, because the Due
Process Clause confers "no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interest of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual." However, courts have allowed for the possibility, post-DeShaney, of
negligence causes of action under state law. See, e.g., Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs.
Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1308-09 (Ohio 1990) (holding that the immunity provided social workers
by the child abuse reporting statute did not control plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994) based on negligence and misfeasance). See generally Laura Huber Martin, Comment,
Caseworker Liability for the Negligent Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 191
(1991) (discussing the relationship between case worker tort liability and the various immunity
doctrines).
119. See, for example, B.W. v. Meade County, 534 N.W.2d 595, 597-98 (S.D. 1995), which
held that a good faith, albeit negligent, failure to further investigate an allegation of abuse
would not pierce the statutory grant of immunity. Though not many of them succeed, the
number of § 1983 actions brought against social workers for negligent interference with a
parent's fimdamental interest in directing the upbringing of a child is growing. See, e.g.,
Oldfield v. Benavidez, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172-73 (N.M. 1994) (holding that the constitutionally
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resolve most cases against social workers for negligent investigation
at the summary judgment stage, but, as is true for reporters, these
lawsuits cost agencies time and money, even though the social
workers usually win.
Arguably, much of the "negligence" which gives rise to lawsuits
against CPS agencies is caused at some level by insufficient funds,
and defending these suits causes a tremendous drain on already
scarce resources. As noted above, the lack of resources probably re-
sults in an inflated number of reports ultimately determined to be
"unsubstantiated": If a social worker must decide on the basis of a
brief phone call or fifteen minute visit whether a report is true, the
margin for error is bound to be fairly high. Unfortunately, both social
workers and reporters may become increasingly vulnerable to
lawsuits and liability in the wake of the CAPTA Amendments.
IV. CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATmENT ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1996
Recent legislative efforts have focused extensively on issues
regarding children and families in general.20 Rather than following a
coherent pattern of advancing children's interests, however, the vari-
ous proposed bills reflect legislators' profound ambivalence about
whether providing for or protecting children's welfare should be part
of the legislators' job.121 The overall trend at the federal level has
protected interest in family relations is limited by a compelling government interest in
protecting minor children).
120. A total of 437 bills and resolutions were referred to the House Committee on Economic
and Educational Opportunities during the 104th Congress, resulting in 28 public laws.
According to the Committee's conference report:
With Republicans given the opportunity to lead the House of Representatives and, as
such the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities, for the first time in 40
years, the Members of the Committee began the process of reforming the maze of
hundreds of programs and laws that are well intentioned, but often ineffective in truly
helping improve education for children and youth, human services for disadvantaged
citizens, and the workplace for employees and employers.
H.R. REP. No. 104-875, at 1 (1997). The CAPTA Amendments passed through this Committee.
For examples of other bills addressing children and family issues that also passed through the
Committee, see Family Reinforcement Act, H.R. 11, 104th Cong. (1995); Child Support
Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 785, 104th Cong.; Family Planning Amendments Act of 1995,
H.R. 833, 104th Cong.; Comprehensive Early Childhood Education Act of 1995, H.R. 968, 104th
Cong.; Teen Pregnancy Prevention and Parental Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 1115, 104th
Cong.; Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 1271, 104th Cong.
121. Compare Back to Basics Education Reform Act, H.R. 1883, 104th Cong. (1995) (stating
that the bill's purpose was to "strengthen parental, local, and State control of education in the
United States by eliminating the Department of Education and redefining the Federal role in
education"), with the Comprehensive Early Childhood Education Act of 1995, H.R. 968, 104th
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been to pay lip-service to protecting children's interests, while shifting
the responsibility for doing so further from the Federal government,
thus strengthening the role of parents and state governments.
One example of such legislation is the proposed Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995 ("PRRA"), introduced in
Congress in June of 1995.122 While it protects parental rights, the
PRRA purports to exempt from its scope situations involving
traditional understandings of abuse or neglect and cases concerning
custody or other disputes among parents.123  Nonetheless, it would
apparently create a federal cause of action against social workers who
"negligently" or without meeting the necessary burden of proof,
interfere with a parent's "right to direct the upbringing" of the child.
Coupled with the fee-shifting provision, 124 the PRRA would create a
new disincentive for CPS agents to investigate reports, or, if they do
Cong. (stating that the bill was intended to "establish comprehensive early childhood education
programs, early childhood education staff development programs, [and] model Federal
Government early childhood education programs").
122. Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, H.R. 1946, 104th Cong.; S. 984,
104th Cong. This bill was introduced in the House on June 28, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC.
H6481 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (noting the introduction of the bill, as well as the bill's House
sponsors). It was introduced in the Senate on June 29, 1995. See 141 CoNG. REC. S9421 (daily
ed. June 29, 1995) (noting the introduction of, and the Senate sponsors of, the bill). The bill's
sponsors in the House and Senate were predominantly Republicans, totaling 131 of 139 co-
sponsors in the House, and 15 of 15 co-sponsors in the Senate.
The first, and presumably primary, "finding" of the bill states that: "Congress finds that (1)
the Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children
as a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty within the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution." H.R. 1946, § 2(aX1). The purpose of the bill is thus "to protect the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children as a fundamental right." H.R. 1946, § 2(bX1).
The sponsors' perception that this fundamental right needs protection derives from their finding
that "some decisions of Federal and State courts have treated the right of parents not as a
fundamental right but as a nonfundamental right," H.R. 1946, § 2(a)(4), and that "parents face
increasing intrusions into their legitimate decisions and prerogatives by government agencies in
situations that do not involve traditional understandings of abuse or neglect but simply are a
conflict of parenting philosophies." H.R. 1946, § 2(aX5). To effectuate this purpose, the bill
would prohibit any government official from "interfer[ing] with or usurp[ing] the right of a
parent to direct the upbringing of the child." H.R. 1946, § 4. No exception to this prohibition
would be made unless the state actor can prove that the "interference or usurpation is essential
to accomplish a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly drawn or applied in a manner
that is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling interest." H.R. 1946, § 5.
The bill creates a federal claim for any parent who believes he or she has been wrongfully
deprived of the custody or control of his or her child. See H.R. 1946, § 6.
123. See H.R. 1946, § 4 (stating that the phrase" 'right of a parent to direct the upbringing
of a child' shall not include a right of a parent to act... in a manner that constitutes abuse or
neglect of a child as the terms have traditionally been defined"). See also H.R. 1946, § 7 (stating
that the bill does not apply to "domestic relations cases concerning the appointment of parental
rights between parents in custody disputes").
124. See H.R. 1946, § 8 (providing that attorney's fees and expert witness fees may be
awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)-(c) (1994)).
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investigate, to react unless the indications of abuse are practically
indisputable.12 5
The legislative history behind the CAPTA Amendments 26 sug-
gests that many of the same forces were at work here. Congressional
testimony points out that "child abuse and neglect is a tragedy of
growing proportions," 121 that over one million children were confirmed
victims of abuse or neglect in 1994,128 and that Department of Health
and Human Services statistics indicate that nearly three million chil-
dren overall, including those not investigated by CPS agencies, were
actually abused or neglected in 1993.129 Other testimony, however,
and congressional reports presented by the bill's sponsors focused
125. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 393, 397 (1996) (suggesting that the bill would also restrict intervention to cases involving
"traditional definitions of abuse and neglect" and to cases involving medical decisions that would
result in "danger to the child" or "serious physical injury to the child").
Most of the text of the PRRA was taken from THE CHRISTIAN COALITION, A CONTRACT WITH
THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A BOLu PLAN BY THE CHRISTIAN COALITION TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY
AND RESTORE COMMON-SENSE VALUES 1 (1995). See Woodhouse, supra, at 398. Professor
Woodhouse's article provides a comprehensive overview of the political context which produced
the bill.
Critics of liberal social programs are concerned not only with protecting private rights to the
control and education of children, but also with enforcing private responsibilities for the care
and support of children. The House Bill presents the other side of the coin, the privatization of
family supports that proposed welfare reforms and child support enforcement initiatives sought.
See id. at 399. The bill originated with the Christian Coalition and has gained support in
Congress, even from some Democrats and moderate Republicans. In fact, co-sponsors included
Representative Bob Clement, a Democrat from Tennessee; Senator John Warner, a moderate
Republican from Virginia; then-Senator Bob Dole, a Republican from Kansas; and Senator Bill
Frist, a Republican from Tennessee. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, bHl04 File (Sept. 1,
1997).
The 104th Congress never voted on the bill, and the 105th Congress has not yet reported it
from Committee during the first session. See id. Nonetheless, its supporters, including such
groups as "Of the People," VOCAL (Victims of Child Abuse Laws), and the Heritage Foundation,
have sponsored similar legislation at the state level. In Colorado, a Parents' Rights Amendment
to the state Constitution was narrowly defeated in a statewide referendum in November 1996,
and similar bills are being proposed in state legislatures around the country. According to
David E. Rovella, Colorado Child Abuse Trojan Horse Feared, THE NATL L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at
A6, the Colorado initiative was the first one brought by Of the People on a constitutional level.
Supporters placed the proposal on the ballot after supporters obtained 83,000 signatures of
registered voters, 28,000 more signatures than required. See id. The .group has sponsored
similar laws, which have either been rejected or are still pending, in at least 27 other states.
See id. The South Carolina and Virginia legislatures are currently considering similar bills.
See, e.g., H.R. 3168, 112th Sess. (S.C. 1997) (containing verbatim the text of the federal PRRA).
126. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235,
110 Stat. 3063 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i).
127. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Olivia A.
Golden, Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services), available in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Database.




extensively on the numbers of parents injured by "false" reports.
Senator Dan Coats, one of the bill's co-sponsors, acknowledged that
one million reports of child abuse are substantiated each year, but
emphasized the nearly two million "false or unsubstantiated re-
ports... that are filed wrongfully and in some cases maliciously."130
According to Senator Coats, "[wihat this means is that case workers,
who are already overworked, are conducting [two] million investiga-
tions at some level, possibly resulting in inappropriate interven-
tions-including removal of the children from their homes."13 Also
according to Senator Coats, these investigations are unnecessary and
prevent case workers from getting to those children who are truly in
need of help. 3 2 To protect individuals from false reports, the CAPTA
Amendments restrict the immunity provisions to good faith reports.13
According to Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the other co-sponsor, the
Amendments also place "a stronger emphasis on training of mandated
reporters and case workers.., by building in an assessment compo-
nent in the reporting and investigation process."' 34
Several problems exist with Senator Coats's assessment.
First, he fails to distinguish meaningfully between erroneous and
unsubstantiated reports. Second, he seems to assume that any
unsubstantiated report is "unnecessary," which illustrates his
conflation of unsubstantiated reports with those that are in fact
erroneous. This conflation ignores the fact that reporting statutes
deliberately place the degree of suspicion required for reporting at a
very low level' 35 to encourage reporting and protect as many children
as possible.1386 Establishing a low level of suspicion necessarily
assumes that enduring some erroneous reports is the price for
detecting as much abuse as possible. Establishing a high standard of
proof, on the other hand, ensures that some actual cases of abuse will
ultimately be considered "unsubstantiated." Third, he provides
absolutely no support for his allegation that many reports are filed
"maliciously"-in fact, malice is rarely alleged.13 7 Fourth, Senator
Coats omits the fact that nearly every state already has "good faith"
130. 142 CONG. REc. Sl1581 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
131. See id.
132. See 141 CONG. REc. S8257 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Coats).
133. See 142 CONG. REC. S11581 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
134. 141 CONG. REC. S8264 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
135. In Tennessee, the level is "reasonably indicates." See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a)
(1996).
136. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
137. The same informal LEXIS survey cited in note 21 revealed a negligible number of
cases in which a credible claim of malice was made.
1998]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:183
immunity, which begs the question of what effect the CAPTA
Amendments' new "good faith" immunity provision is intended to
have outside of directly targeting the few states that provide absolute
immunity.
Besides the "good faith" requirement and the new emphasis on
assessment, the Amendments supposedly provide a stronger
definition of abuse.13 8 This requirement is meant to allow states to
define abuse more broadly if they wish.139
While these changes may seem slight, they nonetheless reflect
a significant shift in policy away from encouraging reporting, and
away from providing broad immunity for reporters.
V. CAPTA'S PROBABLE CHILLING EFFECT ON CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING: POLICY RETRENCHMENT ENCOURAGES STATES TO LOWER
STANDARDS OF PROTECTION
Since states began enacting reporting laws in the early
1960s, 140 legislatures have continuously amended the provisions as
experience reveals areas in need of repair.'4' Just as CAPTA had
substantial impact on the evolution of state statutes, the CAPTA
Amendments will likely determine the course of a new generation of
state child protection laws. The legislative history of the
Amendments articulates national policy to a large extent, and
indicates how state legislatures and courts should interpret the
138. The CAPTA Amendments urge states to define "abuse" to include "at a minimum, any
recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious
physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure which presents an
imminent risk of serious harm." Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 110, 110 Stat. 3063, 3078 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(h)).
139. The change "follows from the committee's belief that Federal leadership to States
must allow States the flexibility they need to protect children rather than perpetuate Federal
micromanagement." S. REP. No. 104-117, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA4.N. 3490,
3504.
140. Enacted in 1963, California's reporting law was the first. See Daly, supra note 42, at
303.
141. See Fraser, supra note 54, at 650 (discussing the evolution of state reporting statutes).
In 1978, Fraser identified three distinct generations of reporting laws, with each generation
responding to perceived failings of the prior generation. See id. Fraser considered the first gen-
eration to focus simply on identification of cases of suspected abuse, and the second generation
to focus on identification and investigation. See id. The third generation focused on
identification and investigation and began to address "the complex issues of intervention
[including] the issues of limited resources, limited expertise, lack of coordination, a need to
involve the general public as well as the professionals, and the need to establish a planning
component." Id. (citations omitted). Considering that 19 years have passed since this article
was published, current laws are probably in a fourth or fifth generation. The CAPTA
Amendments will surely engender yet another generation.
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Amendments. Thus, the policy shift at the national level will likely
have a reverberating effect in state legislatures.
At least some of the policy shift regarding child protection
statutes stems from a legitimate concern that CPS agencies are physi-
cally incapable of responding effectively to all reports of suspected
maltreatment. 142 Criticisms of this aspect of the system have been
voiced almost since the enactment of the first reporting statutes. 143
Adequate funding for community-based prevention programs, better
training of CPS staff, and differential methods of treating substanti-
ated abuse or neglect could remedy these problems at least in part.'"
Unfortunately, adequate funding is the key to making those im-
provements, but is not likely to be forthcoming from either the federal
or state governments, and is specifically not guaranteed by the
Amendments. 45  More troubling, however, is the shift in focus.
Besides targeting CPS agencies for responding inadequately, the
Amendments also target reporting and reporters as part of the
problem. The shift is most plainly visible in the provisions directing
that research be carried out "to obtain standardized data on false,
unfounded, unsubstantiated, and substantiated reports,"146  on
"causes, prevention, [and] assessment" of child abuse and neglect,147
and on "the extent to which the lack of adequate resources and the
lack of adequate training of individuals required by law to
report.., have contributed to the inability of a State to respond
effectively to serious cases of child abuse and neglect." 48
A. "Good Faith" Immunity
The assumption underlying the "good faith" language in the
CAPTA Amendments is that too much reporting is occurring. This
142. See 142 Cong. Rec. S11581 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Coats)
(expressing a concern regarding overworked caseworkers).
143. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 54, at 668 (referring to criticisms mentioned and citing
articles dating from the early 1970s voicing similar concerns).
144. See Child Welfare: Where Should Our Priorities Be? Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Early Childhood, Youth & Families of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Anne Cohn Donnelly, Executive Director,
National Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse), available in WESTLAW,
USTESTIMONY Database (making the case for prevention).
145. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
235, § 100(6), 110 Stat. 3063, 3064 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101) (deleting the phrase
"ensure that every community in the United States has" and inserting the phrase "assist States
and communities with.").
146. Id. § 104(3)(DMi), 110 Stat. at 3066 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5104(cX1XCXi)).
147. Id. § 105(aX1XD), 110 Stat. at 3067 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5105(aX1XD)).
148. Id. § 105(aX1XE)(v), 110 Stat. at 3068 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5105(aXl)(EXv)).
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assumption signals a significant policy shift. Moreover, as discussed
above, the vast majority of states already provide only good faith
immunity, thus begging the question of why the addition of good faith
language is considered so crucial. In part, the change is probably
attributable to a congressional effort to placate parents' rights
groups. 49 Senator Coats's statements also suggest that the "good
faith" language specifically addresses California, the only state to
have actually been confronted with cases involving probable malice.
Senator Coats de-emphasizes the fact that of the two-thirds of the
reports that are "unsubstantiated," only a very small percentage of
these are actually found to be false, and an even smaller number are
found to be knowingly false or malicious.10 He also neglects to ac-
knowledge that subsequent reports ultimately substantiate a signifi-
cant percentage of these unsubstantiated reports, and that even in
"unsubstantiated" cases, there is often evidence that abuse did oc-
cur.151
To date, policy and presumptions of good faith have
encouraged reporting and justified disposition of claims against
reporters at the summary judgment stage. Courts have tended to
justify the disposition of claims on public policy grounds which the
legislative pronouncements manifest. The new language in CAPTA is
likely to persuade state courts that they have been providing too much
immunity for doctors and other reporters. Possible consequences
include taking away the presumption of good faith which most
defendants have enjoyed. Removing the presumption of good faith
would shift the burden of proof to defendants, essentially forcing them
to go to trial on the issue of good faith. Perhaps even more harmfully,
the policy shift may discourage courts from continuing to recognize
negligent reporting as falling under the purview of "good faith."152
State legislatures might react and confirm courts' and
reporters' fears by passing legislation specifically shifting the burden
of proof. The CAPTA Amendments will likely precipitate a new
generation of amendments to state child protective laws, as did the
149. See supra Part IV (discussing the influence of the parents' rights debate in connection
with the enactment of the CAPTA Amendments).
150. In fact, no statistics are available for the percentage of actual knowingly false or
malicious reports.
151. See Woodhouse, supra note 125, at 409 n.63 (noting that in many 'unsubstantiated"
cases there is "significant evidence" that abuse did occur).
152. Again, unsubstantiated reports do not necessarily result from negligence. Accurate re-
ports made in good faith may ultimately be found to be "unsubstantiated" for lack of evidence or




original CAPTA in 1974. Federal policy guidelines and heavy
lobbying by parents' rights groups could influence state legislatures to
change the "purpose" statements preceding child protective statutes,
thereby abrogating the former emphasis on protecting as many
children as possible. 153  States may also change their immunity
statutes to define "good faith" immunity more precisely. In
particular, as the Amendments seem aimed at California and other
states currently providing absolute immunity to mandatory reporters,
legislatures might feel somewhat coerced' 5 to add the phrase "good
faith" if the phrase is lacking. They might also remove language
providing a presumption of good faith, or provide that gross
negligence qualifies as bad faith.
Even if these concerns are overstated, the mere possibility of
judicial and legislative changes may have a chilling effect on potential
reporters. For pediatricians and emergency room physicians in par-
ticular, the responsibility to report is already an expensive burden. 55
Currently, most physicians who report know that they have statutory
immunity for reporting, but they also know that such immunity does
not preclude lawsuits which they must defend. Defending these suits
is time-consuming, disruptive, and emotionally draining.
Furthermore, if physicians and hospitals face increased doubt that
courts would dispose of such suits on summary judgment, they will be
much more likely to limit their reporting to injuries they know are
abuse-related, rather than reporting mere suspicions.
A more appropriate judicial and legislative response would be
to provide health care workers with absolute immunity such that
courts can routinely dismiss claims against healthcare workers on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.156 Courts in Alabama
and California appear to dismiss claims against mandatory reporters
on a similar basis. 157 In addition, California has implemented a fund
153. I am not suggesting that protecting children is not a priority for most lawmakers. I
am suggesting that most lawmakers are unwilling to pay for it-politically or financially.
154. Federal financial aid is predicated on compliance with federal mandates, so states may
feel pressure to comply strictly with the new amendments. See Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 107(b), 110 Stat. 3063, 3072 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a), (requiring that states satisfy certain prerequisites in order to
qualify for federal grants).
155. See supra notes 87, 103 and accompanying text (discussing the financial burdens that
mandatory reporters face).
156. See FED. R. CIw. PROC. § 12(bX6) (providing that a defense of "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted" may be made by motion "at the option of the pleader").
157. See Brown v. Pound, 585 So. 2d 885, 886-87 (Ala. 1991) (affirming dismissal of a case
filed against a physician on the basis of absolute immunity); Thomas v. Chadwick, 244 Cal. App.
3d 813, 819-20, 826 (1990) (affirming a trial court's granting of a defendant physician's motion
19981
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for reimbursing mandatory reporters for the legal costs of defending a
claim158 Reimbursing mandatory reporters is a good idea, but
dismissing claims, rather than adjudicating them to a summary
judgment, is a much less costly and less time-consuming
alternative-as the approximately 200 page tome filed as Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment in the
Bryant-Bruce case i~lustrates.1'9
Increasing the risk of liability for doctors, particularly for those
doctors currently in absolute immunity jurisdictions, does nothing to
further the goals of detecting and decreasing the incidence of child
abuse. Chilling child abuse reporting will undoubtedly result in a
decrease in the number of unsubstantiated reports. It will also inevi-
tably result in a decrease in the number of substantiated reports. 160
Closing our eyes to the problem does not mean it will go away, and
the net consequence of chilling reporting-recognized early in the
evolution of reporting laws-will be an increase in the number of
children who fall through the cracks.
B. Emphasis on "Assessment"
The CAPTA Amendments' new emphasis on "assessment" re-
flects criticisms of the current system that mandated reporters and
social workers are inadequately trained to recognize child abuse, and
that CPS agencies are therefore required to investigate every report
for judgment on the pleadings, even accepting as true for purposes of the appeal the plaintiffs
allegation that the doctor knowingly made a false report of abuse).
158. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(c) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that mandatory report-
ers may present claims to a government body for reasonable attorney's fees incurred 'in any
action against that person on the basis of making a [required] report... if the court has dis-
missed the action upon a demurrer or motion for summary judgment made by that person" or if
the mandatory reporter "prevails in the action").
159. See Memorandum in Support of the Vanderbilt Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 1, Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., No. 3-96-0153, 1997 WL
440962 (M.D. Tenn. July 3, 1997) (containing affidavits from all the involved doctors and the
child's guardian ad litem, as well as the transcripts from the circuit court proceedings and the
original order granting temporary custody to the state).
160. Anne Cohn Donnelly, Executive Director of the National Committee to Prevent Child
Abuse, has claimed that as reports of abuse have increased, the percentage of substantiated
reports has remained fairly constant. See Child Welfare: Where Should Our Priorities Be?
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth & Families of the House Comm. on
Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Anne Cohn
Donnelly, Executive Director, National Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse), available
in WESTLAW, USTESTIMONY Database. Statistics also suggest that the numbers of children
subjected to abuse are actually increasing, not just that more abuse is being uncovered by
increased reporting. See id. See also Meriwether, supra note 45, at 141 (suggesting that




they receive. Because some reporters report even the most tenuous
suspicions, critics argue, "false" claims inundate CPS agencies and
drain the agencies' resources, rendering the agencies incapable of
responding effectively to dire cases of abuse.161 This focus on assess-
ment presents the flip side of the "good faith" coin: In theory, if we
reduce the number of erroneous reports, and through training in-
crease social workers' ability to distinguish between "false" and "true"
reports, then the available financial resources will better help the
children and families who really need it.
On the surface, this argument is difficult to dispute.
Unfortunately, the assumption that better training will enable CPS
agents to distinguish true reports from false reports on the basis of a
telephone call is naive. Moreover, Senator Kassebaum's statement
regarding the training of mandated reporters is problematic for the
many states that require any person who knows or suspects a case of
child abuse to report. 162 Even more problematic is the implication
that CPS agencies should not be required to investigate every report.
The Amendments envision a form of triage without recognizing that
necessity already requires triage, and they fail to address the causes
of this de facto triage.
Certainly room for improvement exists, and many of the criti-
cisms of the system are valid. However, the CAPTA Amendments
selected areas for improvement that are primarily politically moti-
vated responses to the most vocal and best organized critics of the
current system.
C. Other Changes Signaling Policy Shift
The CAPTA Amendments provide some other changes. First,
in the "Findings" section, "child and family protection" replaces the
term "child protection," and the term "family" is inserted after the
term "child" everywhere that "child" is listed.'63 Representatives from
family rights groups now participate on the national Advisory Board
on Child Abuse Neglect, as do children's rights advocates. 64 While
enhancing the interests of "families," that is parents, the
161. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing the statements of Senator
Coats).
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Kassebaum's
statement that the CAPTA Amendments emphasize training of mandated reporters).
163. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
235, § 100(6)(7), 110 Stat. 3063, 3064 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101).
164. See id. § 102(cX12), 110 Stat. at 3065 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5102(c)(12)).
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Amendments also provide for "expedited termination" of parental
rights-but only in extreme and rare circumstances. 165 For example,
it is clear under the new law that states need not require the
reunification of a surviving child with a parent who has been
convicted of manslaughter of another child of that parent, or who has
committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the
child or another child of the same parent.166
The Amendments do not go far enough in facilitating the ter-
mination of parental rights, but the new emphasis on "families" is
evidence of the influence of parents injured by unsubstantiated re-
ports, of parents' rights groups, and of the religious right. The lan-
guage is for the most part superfluous, but it contributes to the
overall effect of tilting the scales in favor of "parents' rights" over
children's protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CAPTA Amendments' higher immunity threshold and
ambivalence toward promoting reporting will ultimately increase
litigation, and thus the cost of even good faith reporting of child
abuse, and will also increase liability for erroneously reporting child
abuse. Increased litigation and decreased immunity will likely have a
serious chilling effect on child abuse reporting and provide a
tremendous disincentive for state agencies to react promptly to
reports of suspected abuse. The semantic changes to CAPTA are
small overall, but legislators need to consider the substantial
ramifications of the policy shift which underlies these changes. Most
of the criticism leveled at Child Protective Services is valid and
highlights the need for a remedy. The CAPTA Amendments, however,
do too little to address the areas most in need of improvement:
funding and prevention. It remains to be seen how state legislatures
will respond to the Amendments, and whether the next generation of
child protective statutes will do more that put another Band-Aid on
the perceived ills by attempting to decrease the number of "false"
reports. It will also be interesting to see how the states that
guarantee absolute immunity under their current child protective
laws respond to the new "good faith" mandate.
165. See id. § 107(b)(2)(A)(xi)(I), 110 Stat. at 3074 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xi)(I)).




Even before the CAPTA Amendments, deterrents to reporting
existed. Underreporting is still recognized as a problem hampering
detection of abuse and efforts to protect abused children.
In order to come to grips with the problem of abuse, the law
should encourage states to distinguish between health care providers
and other types of potential reporters, and to provide absolute immu-
nity for physicians who do report suspected abuse. Energy should
then be focused upon providing social services systems with adequate
resources to respond appropriately to allegations of abuse. Societal
resources should also aid child abuse prevention by preventing teen-
age pregnancies and by providing support for young and poor families
and those parents afflicted with drug and alcohol addictions. To chill
reporting is merely to stick our heads in the sand; ignoring the prob-
lem does not make it go away.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in the Bryant-Bruce case; nonetheless, it will be under-
standable if Gregory's doctor hesitates to report the next time he is
confronted with a child suffering from a suspicious childhood injury.
Caroline T. Trost*
* I extend thanks to Lee Barfield of Bass, Berry & Sims and to Joseph Woodruff of
Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis for providing me with their briefs on the subject of reporter
immunity.
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